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Abstract. In this document we present an overview of the background to and 
goals of the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) as well as the design of its 
winner, Argon2, and its security requirements and properties. 
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1 Background of the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) 
The Password Hashing Competition (PHC) [1] was an open competition run between 
2013 and 2015 by a group of cryptographers that aimed to select one or more pass-
word hashing schemes, meeting modern requirements, for recommendation as a (de-
facto) standard and ended up selecting the Argon2 [2] scheme as its winner. Given the 
ubiquity of passwords as a (primary) means of authentication to a range of services 
(from web services to mobile, desktop or server systems) or data protection systems 
(eg. disk encryption solutions), the persistence of password re-use [3] and the (in-
creasing) trend of credential-holding database breaches [4,5,6] password protection is 
a topic of continuing importance. The initial measure aimed at limiting the impact of 
database breaches was the usage of cryptographic hash functions for password storage 
[7] where passwords aren’t stored as plaintext but as a hash digest. When users au-
thenticate their password is hashed and compared to the stored digest. The security 
properties of (cryptographically secure) hash functions [44] aim to make them practi-
cally impossible to invert. In this manner a database compromise doesn’t result in the 
immediate disclosure of user credentials but aims to force an attacker to mount a 
brute-force [9] or dictionary attack [10] on the hashes. Unfortunately such a scheme is 
vulnerable to space/time trade-off attacks [11] (such as the infamous rainbow tables 
[12]) where an attacker precomputes cryptographic hash functions and stores the re-
sult in a lookup table. In this fashion the bulk of the work is performed once, during 
table generation. Every subsequently attacked hash would simply involve a lookup 
operation rather than iterative hash computation. The use of salting [13] adds a degree 
of uniqueness to each individual password hash that prevents identical passwords 
from hashing to identical hashes, slows down brute-force and dictionary attacks (since 
we cannot compare a candidate against an entire database at once) and mitigates pre-
computed lookup table attacks. However, hash functions were not designed to be slow 
(often the contrary), passwords themselves often have very low entropy [14] and 
technological advances and widespread availability of powerful hardware [15,16] and 
cracking software leveraging it [17,18] have made fast (bulk-)cracking of password 
hashes (salted or otherwise) a very feasible affair for many attackers. A solution to 
this problem roughly comes down to the heuristic of “slowing down” calculations to 
the attacker. A commonly used (but not the only) technique for achieving this is key 
stretching [19] which involves iteratively applying the hash function a tweakable 
number of times. Using dedicated hardware (eg. GPU, FPGA, ASIC, etc.) [20] im-
plementations, however, cracking such purely ‘CPU-bounded’ hashes might still re-
main within the realm of the feasible for a well-equipped attacker. Memory-bounded 
hash functions [21] were introduced to address this and any modern password hashing 
scheme will see a mixture of both bounds. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Estimated hardware cost to crack hashed passwords in 1 year as per 2002 [21] 
 
The fallout associated with credential leakage from database breaches involving inad-
equate hashing schemes is significant [22,23,24] but up until now there has been a 
low variety of password hashing schemes seeking to address these issues. The only 
standardized scheme is PBKDF2 [25] with bcrypt [26] and scrypt [21] being the main 
alternatives. And although improving over the alternative of regular hash functions, as 
illustrated in figure 1, these schemes suffer from several drawbacks. PBKDF2 makes 
no attempt to minimize GPU/ASIC advantages [27] since it can be implemented ra-
ther efficiently with little RAM, bcrypt lacks support for tunable memory require-
ments [28, 8] as well as easily fitting into FPGA designs and scrypt does not allow 
users to only increase time or memory requirements as well as being suboptimal in its 
defenses against ASICs [29] and TMTO and side-channel attacks [30]. In addition, 
recent work [20] on GPU- and FPGA-facilitated cracking of bcrypt and scrypt hashes 
has shown scrypt can be attacked quite efficiently for smaller parameters using GPUs 
and bcrypt can be attacked rather efficiently using FPGAs, as shown in figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2: Hashes per dollar-second taking energy and hardware cost for two years into 
account as per 2015 [20] 
 
As such the PHC was started in order to develop a password hashing scheme capable 
of meeting the defensive needs of modern applications faced with attackers with 
modern capabilities. The main focus was on algorithms relevant to most common 
password hashing scheme applications such as (web) service authentication, key deri-
vation or user login. Apart from security requirements (as discussed in section 2) 
candidates were evaluated for simplicity (overall scheme clarity, ease of implementa-
tion, limited number of internally used primitives or constructions, etc.) and function-
ality (cost parameter effectiveness, ability to transform existing hashes to different 
cost settings without password knowledge or possibly even renewed user login, etc.). 
 
In short the security problem addressed by the PHC and the Argon2 scheme can be 
formulated as follows: The PHC and its winner Argon2 seek to present a password 
hashing scheme that offers the security properties of a ‘regular’ cryptographically 
secure hash function while preventing attacks traditionally associated with them and 
mitigate the effectiveness of both software-optimized and hardware-optimized crack-
ers (thus aiding in eg. reducing the fallout of credential-holding database compro-
mises. 
2 Security Requirements of Password-Hashing Schemes 
In general [31] password hash cracking involves evaluating multiple candidates (pref-
erably as simultaneous as possible), as fast as possible in order to test as many as 
possible per given time unit, through the password hashing scheme in question and 
testing them against one or more target hashes. As such defenses complicating this 
(slowing down evaluation, reducing opportunities for parallelism, etc.) lie at the heart 
of password hashing scheme security properties and the overall scheme security is 
defined by the evaluation of how well it manages to frustrate password cracking ef-
forts. Below follows a list of the core desirable security properties of password hash-
ing schemes as drawn from the PHC requirements [37] and a range of relevant litera-
ture [2, 8, 11, 34, 35, 41] based on the types of attacks a hashing scheme is faced 
with: 
  Cryptographic Security [8]: The scheme should be cryptographically secure 
and as such possess the following properties: 1) Preimage resistance, 2) 
Second preimage resistance and 3) collision resistance. In addition it should 
avoid other cryptographic weaknesses such as those present in (some) Merk-
le-Damgård constructions [32] (eg. length extension attacks, partial message 
collisions, etc. [33]). 
 
 Defense against lookup table / TMTO Attacks [11]: The scheme should aim 
to make TMTO attacks that allow for precomputed lookup table generation, 
such as Rainbow Tables, infeasible. 
 
 Defense against CPU-optimized ‘crackers’ [34]: The scheme should be 
‘CPU-hard’, that is, it should require significant amounts of CPU processing 
in a manner that cannot be optimized away through either software or hard-
ware. As such, cracking-optimized (multi-core) CPU software implementa-
tions (eg. written in assembly, testing multiple input sets in parallel) should 
offer only minimal speed-up improvements compared to those intended for 
validation (“slower for attackers, faster for defenders” [28]). 
 
 Defense against hardware-optimized ‘crackers’ [35]: The scheme should be 
‘memory-hard’, that is, it should significant amounts of RAM capacity in a 
manner that cannot be optimized away through eg. TMTO attacks [36]. As 
such cracking-optimized ASIC, FPGA and GPU implementations should of-
fer only minimal speed up improvements (eg. in terms of time-area product) 
compared to those intended for validation. As noted by Aumasson [28] one 
of the main scheme design challenges is ensuring minimized efficiency on 
GPUs, FPGAs and ASICs (in order to minimize benefits of cracking-
optimized implementations) and maximized efficiency on general-purpose 
CPUs (in order to maintain regular use efficiency). 
 
 Defense against side-channel attacks: Depending on the use-case (eg. for 
key derivation or authentication to a device seeking to protect against modi-
fication by the device owner) side-channel attacks might be a relevant ave-
nue of attack. Password hashing schemes should aim to offer side-channel 
resilience. With regards to password hashing scheme security we will focus 
on security versus the cache-timing [38] type of side-channel attacks given 
the existence of such attacks against the commonly used scrypt scheme [30]. 
The second category of side-channel attacks we will take into consideration 
are so-called Garbage Collector Attacks (GCAs). GCAs have been discussed 
in literature [41] as an instance of a ‘memory leak’ attack relevant to pass-
word hashing scheme security. GCAs consist of a scenario where an attacker 
has access to a target machine’s internal memory either after termination of 
the hashing scheme or at some point where the password itself is still present 
in memory (the so-called Weak GCA variant). Both types of attack use their 
memory observations to find some (intermediate or remnant) value y derived 
from password input 𝑝 using function 𝐹 where testing password candidates 
𝑝′ using 𝐹 requires significantly less effort compared to the original hashing 
scheme thus reducing its overall security. 
3 The Argon2 Password-Hashing Scheme 
Argon2 [2] is a family of password hashing schemes that was declared winner of the 
PHC [1]. This section will briefly sketch the Argon2 scheme and its two major vari-
ants: Argon2d and Argon2i. For the sake of brevity we will omit discussion of its 
Server Relief (SR) and Client-Independent Update (CIU) features and similarly con-
sider the (as-of-yet ‘non-official’) additional scheme variants Argon2ds and Argon2id 
out of scope. 
 
Argon2 is optimized for the x86 architecture, (independently) scalable in both time 
and memory dimensions, supports (single-instance, inner) parallelism and has two 
major variants: Argon2d and Argon2i. Argon2d is the faster variant using data-
dependent memory access (to thwart tradeoff attacks) making it suitable for applica-
tions where side-channel attacks are not a threat such as backend servers or cryptocur-
rencies. It makes a single pass over the memory. Argon2i is slower and uses data-
independent memory access making it suitable for password hashing and password-
based key derivation uses. It makes 3 passes over the memory. Argon2 takes as its 
inputs a message 𝑃 (eg. password), nonce 𝑆 (eg. salt), parallelism degree 𝑝, tag length 
𝜏, memory size 𝑚 (where the number of 1024-byte blocks is 𝑚′ = ⌊
𝑚
4𝑝
⌋), iteration 
count 𝑡 (which allows for running time adjustment independently of memory size), 
secret value 𝐾 (which serves as optional secret key), associated data 𝑋, type value 𝑦 
(0 for Argon2d, 1  for Argon2i) and version number 𝑣  (always 0𝑥10) giving API 
𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑛2(𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑝, 𝜏, 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝐾, 𝑋, 𝑦, 𝑣). Recommended parameter values can be found in 
the Argon2 specification. 
3.1 Operation 
Argon2 has a mode of operation (as illustrated in figure 3) which can iterate for a 
variable number of passes. It starts by drawing entropy from supplied message 𝑃 and 
nonce 𝑆 which it hashes (together with other parameters) using hash function ℋ to 
512-bit initial hash value 𝐻0 = ℋ(𝑝, 𝜏, 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑣, 𝑦, 𝑃′, 𝑆′, 𝐾′, 𝑋′) where values 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝐾, 𝑋 
are prepended with their lengths ie.: 𝑃′ = (𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑃), 𝑃). Next it starts filling memory 
with 𝑚′  8192-bit blocks. Memory is organized as a  𝑝 𝑥 𝑞  matrix where row/lane 
count is determined by parallelism degree 𝑝 and column count 𝑞 =
𝑚′
𝑝
. Blocks are 
computed as follows, where 𝐻′(𝑋) is a variable-length hash function built upon ℋ, 
𝐺(𝑋, 𝑌) a compression function and block indexes 𝑖′ and 𝑗′ are determined by index-
ing function 𝜃(𝑖, 𝑗): 
  
𝐵[𝑖][0] = 𝐻′(𝐻0||𝑖||0), 𝐵[𝑖][1] = 𝐻′(𝐻0||𝑖||1), 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑝 
𝐵[𝑖][𝑗] = 𝐺(𝐵[𝑖][𝑗 − 1], 𝐵[𝑖′][𝑗′]), 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑝, 2 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑞 
 
If we have multiple passes over the memory (ie.: 𝑡 > 1) the procedure is repeated 
except for the first two blocks of a lane: 
𝐵[𝑖][0] = 𝐺(𝐵[𝑖][𝑞 − 1], 𝐵[𝑖′][𝑗′]), 𝐵[𝑖][𝑗] = 𝐺(𝐵[𝑖][𝑗 − 1], 𝐵[𝑖′][𝑗′]) 
 
In order to enable block computation parallelism memory is partitioned into 𝑆 = 4 
vertical slices where slice/lane intersections are segments of length 
𝑞
𝑆
. Segments of the 
same slice are computed in parallel. After 𝑡 iterations the final block 𝐵𝑚 is computed 
as the bitwise XOR of the last column and we obtain the output tag ℎ = 𝐻′(𝐵𝑚). 
 
Fig. 3: Single-pass Argon2 with p lanes as based upon figure 2 in [2] 
3.2 Indexing Function 𝜽 
During memory filling, the block indexes 𝑖′, 𝑗′ are determined by indexing function 𝜃 
which differs for Argon2d and Argon2i. For Argon2d we have the data-dependent 
function (𝐽1, 𝐽2) = 𝜃𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝐵[𝑖][𝑗 − 1]0..31, 𝐵[𝑖][𝑗 − 1]32..63)  where 𝑋0..31  denotes 
the first 32 bits of 𝑋. For Argon2i we have the data-independent function (𝐽1||𝐽2) =
𝜃𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝐺
2(𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙1024, {𝑟||𝑙||𝑠||𝑚′||𝑡||𝑦||𝑖||𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙968})  where 𝐺
2  is the 2-round ver-
sion of compression function 𝐺 (see section 3.4) in counter mode, 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑛 an n-byte all-
zero block and the little-endian 8-byte sized pass number 𝑟, lane number 𝑙, slice num-
ber 𝑠, total number of memory blocks 𝑚′, total number of passes 𝑡, Argon2 type 𝑦 
and counter 𝑖 starting from 1 in each segment. The 32-bit values 𝐽1, 𝐽2 are then trans-
formed into block indexes 𝑖′, 𝑗′ as follows (identical for both Argon2 versions): 
 
1. Value 𝑙 = 𝐽2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 determines lane index from which block will be taken. 
If 𝑟 = 𝑠 = 0 (first slice and first pass) then 𝑙 is set to current lane index. 
2. We determine set of candidate indices ℛ as follows: 
a. If 𝑙  is current lane then ℛ  includes all not-yet-overwritten blocks 
computed in this lane excluding 𝐵[𝑖][𝑗 − 1]. 
b. If 𝑙 is not current lane then ℛ includes all blocks in last 𝑆 − 1 = 3 
segments computed and finished in lane 𝑙. If 𝐵[𝑖][𝑗] is first block of 
a segment then last block of ℛ is excluded. 
3. We enumerate blocks in ℛ in order of construction and select the 𝑧𝑡ℎ block 
from it where 𝑧 = |𝑅| − 1 − (
|𝑅|∗((𝐽1)
2 / 232)
232
) as our block with index 𝑖′, 𝑗′. 
3.3 Hash Functions 𝓗 and 𝑯′ 
The hash function ℋ is defined as 𝐻64 where 𝐻𝑥 is defined as the BLAKE2b [42] hash 
function with 𝑥-byte output (where 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 64). The derivative variable-length hash 
function 𝐻′ is illustrated by figure 4 where 𝑋 is its input, 𝑉𝑖 is a 64-byte block, 𝐴𝑖 the 
corresponding first 32 bytes of that block and 𝜏 the tag length in bytes. Note that the 
block 𝑉𝑟+1 is absent if 𝜏 is a multiple of 64. 
 
Fig. 4: Argon2 variable-length hash function 𝐻′ 
3.4 Compression Function G 
The compression function 𝐺(𝑋, 𝑌) is permutation-based (chosen to avoid the prob-
lems associated with iterative compression functions [43]), operates on two 8192-bit 
input blocks, produces a 1024-bit output block and is built upon the BLAKE2b round 
function 𝒫 [42] which in turn operates on (and produces) eight 128-bit blocks and is 
applied first row-wise and then column-wise as illustrated in figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Argon2 compression function 𝐺 [2] 
4 Security Analysis of Argon2 
This section discusses how and why the Argon2 scheme matches the security re-
quirements outlined in section 2. The overall scheme security is determined by its 
meeting of these individual requirements. 
4.1 Cryptographic Security 
Collision resistance: In the initial stage inputs are processed by the hash function ℋ 
defined as the BLAKE2b function which is considered cryptographically secure. The 
Argon2 scheme is claimed [2] (by reductionist proof) to be internally collision re-
sistant even though compression function 𝐺  is neither claimed to be collision nor 
preimage resistant. Since the attacker has no control over the inputs of 𝐺, however, 
collisions are both very unlikely and uncontrollable. Consider, for example, that an 
attacker manages to find a collision in 𝐺 for two arbitrary 𝑚1, 𝑚2 such that 𝐺(𝑚1) =
𝐺(𝑚2) then, in order to extend this to a collision for the overall scheme, the attacker 
would have to find a corresponding preimage for ℋ(𝑥) (where 𝑥 is some value de-
termined by ‘backtracking’ 𝑚1 or 𝑚2 through the algorithm) which is infeasible con-
sidering ℋ is a cryptographically secure hash function [42]. Furthermore, care is tak-
en to avoid block collisions by initializing starting memory blocks with a counter and 
making sure the first block in any lane cannot refer (via indexing function 𝜃) to the 
last block of the previous lane. 
 
Preimage resistance: While, as noted above, the internal compression function 𝐺 is 
not claimed to be preimage resistant, Argon2’s pre-processing of user input with a 
cryptographically secure hash function ℋ  makes the overall scheme preimage re-
sistant. Consider, for example, an attacker is able to find an 𝑚 such that 𝐺(𝑚) = ℎ 
for any arbitrary ℎ. In order to extend this preimage attack to the overall scheme the 
attacker would eventually have to find a preimage 𝑛 such that ℋ(𝑛) = 𝑚′ which is 
infeasible given ℋ is cryptographically secure [42]. 
 
Second Preimage resistance: As with the above properties, consider an attacker is 
able to mount a second preimage attack on compression function 𝐺 thus being able to 
find some 𝑚2  such that 𝐺(𝑚1) = 𝐺(𝑚2), 𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2  for any given 𝑚1 . In order to 
extend this attack to the overall scheme the attacker would eventually have to find 
some 𝑛 such that ℋ(𝑛) = 𝑚2′ (ie. find a preimage for ℋ). 
 
Other cryptographic concerns: There are, as of writing, no mentions of practical cryp-
tographic weaknesses in either the BLAKE2b function in specific or the Argon2 con-
struction in general. The fact that Argon2 does not rely on Merkle-Damgård construc-
tions anywhere in its design also eliminates the concern of attacks (such as eg. length-
extension attacks) specific to that construction [33]. Furthermore, the available crypt-
analysis related to BLAKE2 [62, 63, 64, 65] shows that even attacks targeting re-
duced-round versions are still purely theoretical and in addition NIST’s final report on 
the SHA-3 competition [66] mentions that BLAKE (which is effectively identical at its 
core to BLAKE2) offers a “very large security margin” which, given the intensive 
scrutiny associated with the SHA-3 process, bodes well.  
 
It thus seems safe to conclude that in addition to offering the traditional security prop-
erties associated with cryptographic hash functions, the current state-of-the-art seems 
to indicate no practical cryptographic weaknesses in the Argon2 scheme. 
4.2 Defense against lookup table / TMTO attacks 
When Argon2’s nonces are used (properly), identical messages will produce different 
tags for different nonces TMTO attacks would require precomputing lookup tables for 
all possible nonce values which, given the recommended nonce length of 16 bytes, 
would mean precomputing (and storing) 2128 lookup tables each of which would be 
(at least) several gigabytes in size. This, of course, assumes proper nonce generation 
(preferably using a CSPRNG [45]). If nonce generation happens in a manner where a 
majority of Argon2 hashes is generated using the same (predictable) nonce then 
TMTO attacks could become (more) feasible. It should be noted, however, that Ar-
gon2’s CPU- and memory-hardness properties (see section 2) allow for setting pa-
rameters which would make any precomputation effort in itself (regardless of nonce 
quality) infeasible to most attackers and as such could mitigate the fallout of such a 
scenario. Note that this concerns TMTO attacks (such as Rainbow Tables) targeting 
the password hashing scheme in general rather than those which seek to reduce its 
memory-hardness constraints as mentioned in the section below. 
4.3 Defense against optimized crackers: CPU-Hardness and Memory-
hardness 
When defending against optimized crackers it should be noted that though CPU- and 
memory-hardness might hold for a scheme the essential security offered by it is still a 
function of its time and memory parameters. As such it remains up to the user to de-
termine their use-case (and corresponding threat model) and adjust parameters ac-
cordingly. CPU- and memory-hardness merely aim to guarantee that the scheme 
makes true on the security claims of its parameters (ie. there are no ‘short-cuts’). 
 
CPU-Hardness: The Argon2 scheme is optimized for the x86 architecture (by relying 
on cache and memory organization of recent Intel and AMD processors) and specifi-
cally designed to be GPU/FPGA/ASIC-unfriendly. As such pure-CPU implementa-
tions are meant to be the most efficient platform for running Argon2. Password hash-
ing schemes, however, have deal with optimized CPU-specific cracking implementa-
tions which might exploit this built-in platform affinity. The efficiency of any such 
implementation is bounded by both memory constraints (RAM available for the CPU 
cores to work with) and the number of cores available to the x86 CPU in question 
provided there is no (sufficiently efficient) TMTO attack. The Argon2 designers indi-
cate that multi-core CPUs make support for parallelism attractive (in order to allow 
for increased bandwidth on the intended defender platform) but as described in sec-
tion 3, Argon2 supports a parallelism degree 𝑝  in a way that prohibits effective 
TMTO attacks by restricting the internal parallelism to segments (lane/slice intersec-
tions). Here the slice count 𝑆 = 4 was chosen because it imposed a low synchroniza-
tion overhead while simultaneously imposing time-area penalties (see below) on an 
attacker seeking to perform a TMTO attack. Compared to hardware-specific designs, 
increasing the number of cores on a complex architecture like x86 scales poorly with 
respect to the corresponding price: it becomes expensive very soon. Considering the 
prices of, for example, the 60+ core members of the Intel Xeon Phi x86-based SIMD 
coprocessor family [46] and the additional investment in memory (even when consid-
ering the existing TMTO attack as discussed below) that comes on top of that and 
combined with the fact that Argon2’s parallelism support is TMTO-hardened, it 
seems safe to conclude that the Argon2 design holds up well when faced with an (op-
timized) CPU-only attacker. 
 
Memory-Hardness: When defending against hardware-facilitated attackers we can 
roughly divide them into adversaries with a limited budget, who will opt for GPU and 
FPGA implementations, and those with significant budgets, who will opt for the more 
efficient (but also more expensive) ASIC implementations. For various reasons (such 
as the area occupied by memory, high memory latency in GPUs, higher memory 
manufacturing costs, etc.) properly designed schemes with intensive memory-use 
bound the efficiency gain on hardware-facilitated implementations in a way that 
means they will be neither cheaper nor faster. It is noted in [47] that any scheme 
which uses more than a few hundred MB of RAM is almost certainly inefficient for 
GPU- or FPGA-implementations. Consider, for example, the dedicated hash-cracking 
setup used by the Dutch cyber-security firm Fox-IT [16] which has 4x8GB of RAM 
and eight AMD Radeon R9 290X GPUs [48] as an example of a professional, well-
funded GPU attacker. While the Argon2 designers mention it remains to be seen how 
the scheme holds up against GPU crackers with low memory requirements, the 
scheme’s support for multiple GBs of memory usage per tested password instance 
means that the parallelism (and hence cost-effectiveness) allowed for by even such 
attacker setups is sharply reduced. 
 
In order to more thoroughly estimate attack-cost, in particular for ASIC-equipped 
adversaries, and gain an insight into the degree of ‘memory-hardness’ provided by 
Argon2 the time-area product [49, 50] metric is used. The time-area product provides 
a decent metric since it translates, roughly, into running and production cost and so 
allows defenders to scale their parameters according to their use-case and threat mod-
el. When using the time-area product as a metric what we are looking for is the upper 
limit to the memory reduction factor an attacker can achieve without increasing the 
time-area product. If that limit is sufficiently low the scheme is sufficiently memory-
hard. 
 
Assume we wish to hash a password using our scheme, then the defender allocates a 
given amount of time 𝑡 per password and a certain number of CPU cores before he 
hashes it using a given amount 𝑀  of memory. Memory size 𝑀  translates to some 
ASIC area 𝐴 with running time 𝑇 determined by a mix of computational chain length 
and memory latency. Then time-area product 𝐴𝑇 is what we seek to maximize seeing 
as cracking efficiency gain (in terms of cost and speed) decreases corresponding to 
𝐴𝑇 increase. As per Biryukuv et al. [2] a scheme is called memory-hard if, given a 
cracking implementation requiring reduced memory 𝛼𝑀 (with 𝛼 < 1) and increased 
running-time cost 𝐷(𝛼) and thus having maximum time-area product gain  𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
max𝛼 (
1
𝛼𝐷(𝛼)
) , it holds that 𝐷(𝛼) >
1
𝛼
 as 𝛼 → 0 . In order to evaluate a scheme’s 
memory-hardness in the face of ASIC-equipped attackers one needs to look at the 
TMTO attacks that exist against the scheme and determine the maximum time-area 
product gain the attacker can achieve using these attacks. In general [47], TMTO 
attacks targeting data-dependent memory-hard schemes can reduce the time-area 
product as long as the additional trade-off running-time cost (related to recomputation 
tree depth 𝐷) are smaller than the memory reduction factor, ie. 𝐷(𝛼) ≤
1
𝛼
. Attacks 
targeting data-independent schemes are generally efficient until the reduced memory 
area equals that of the area needed for the multiple recomputation cores. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Computation 𝐶 / Time 𝐷 penalties for the ranking tradeoff attack on Argon2’s 
data-dependent indexing function [2] 
 The designers of Argon2 argue [2] that for both scheme variants Argon2d and Ar-
gon2i, with default number of passes, an ASIC-equipped adversary cannot decrease 
time-area product if the memory is reduced by a factor of 4 or more, with much high-
er penalties applying if more passes over the memory are made. Specifically, a rank-
ing tradeoff attack [43] exists against both the data-dependent and data-independent 
variants of Argon2’s indexing function 𝜃 with results against Argon2d illustrated in 
figure 6. The Argon2i variant is more vulnerable to tradeoff attacks due to its data-
independent indexing function, hence why it uses 3 passes (rather than 1) by default. 
It was found by the Argon2 designers [2] that a memory reduction by a factor of 3 
would already mean that the area occupied by the BLAKE2b recomputation cores 
would exceed the area requirements of 1GB of RAM thus making it the upper limit to 
TMTO effectiveness regardless of scheme variant. In addition to the attacks discussed 
in [2,43], recent work by Corrigan-Gibs et al. [67] claim tradeoff attacks on Argon2i 
which allow for a memory reduction factor of 5 in the case of single-pass Argon2i and 
a reduction factor of ~ 2.72 for the (recommended) multi-pass variant both without 
any additional time penalty. These attacks rely on the above discussed fact that for 
Argon2i the block addresses are known in advance and thus blocks which are not used 
at a given moment can be discarded (until they are overwritten at a later stage) allow-
ing for running the algorithm with smaller memory requirements without correspond-
ing increases in time. In a discussion on the PHC mailing list [68] the idea was pro-
posed to XOR over memory blocks (as the Lyra2 [69] and Gambit [70] schemes do) 
rather than simply overwriting them which prevents blocks from sitting somewhere 
‘unused’ for some time. 
 
Given that both ‘official’ variants (with default number of passes) of the Argon2 
scheme allow for a maximum TMTO memory reduction factor of 3, that the scheme 
comes with recommended memory parameter values of 4GB for backend server au-
thentication, 6GB for encryption key derivation and 1GB for frontend server authenti-
cation uses and that users can additionally increase time-area product via the memory 
parameter and number of passes we can conclude that the scheme’s memory-hardness 
requirement holds up. 
4.4 Defense against Side-Channel Attacks 
Cache-Timing Attack resistance: As noted by Biryukov et al. [43] hashing schemes 
that aim for memory-hardness can be divided into data-independent schemes (which 
access memory blocks according to a predefined pattern independent of data input) 
and data-dependent schemes (which access memory blocks according to a function 
operating on data input). The former allows adversaries to precompute blocks in a 
just-in-time fashion thus allowing for a reduction in required memory if sufficient 
computing power is available, effectively constituting a time-memory tradeoff attack. 
The latter approach prohibits such precomputation but, as is widely documented, data-
dependent computations or memory access tend to be vulnerable to side-channel at-
tacks such as cache-timing attacks [51, 52] in the case of (secret or sensitive) data-
dependent memory access thus potentially revealing information that could allow an 
attacker to reduce the computational efforts required to test password candidates. 
Given that the Argon2d variant uses data-dependent memory access in its indexing 
function 𝜃 (see section 3.2) it is less secure against cache-timing attacks (though their 
practicality versus Argon2d remains to be seen, as mentioned during the PHC selec-
tion process [53]) whereas the Argon2i variant (which uses data-independent memory 
access) is not. As such the Argon2 scheme allows users to adapt depending on their 
particular use-case and the related security requirements, offering the cache-timing 
secure Argon2i variant to those who need it. 
 
Garbage Collector Attack (GCA) resistance: As discussed in section 2, GCAs present 
a possible threat that could allow an attacker to reduce the security offered by the 
scheme. By default Argon2d makes a single pass over the memory and hence does not 
overwrite it, leaving it vulnerable to GCAs. Argon2i, by contrast, makes three passes 
over the memory and hence overwrites it twice thus thwarting any kind of GCA since 
even complete access to all post-computation memory by the attacker would require 
them to make two passes over the memory to test password candidates. The Argon2 
specifications [2] note that “if side-channel attacks is a viable threat, enable the 
memory wiping option in the library call” without further specifying when and how 
memory is wiped. From the reference implementation source-code [54] and PHC 
design discussions [55] it becomes clear, however, that (regardless of Argon2 variant) 
if the clear_memory flag is set then upon finalization of the scheme [56] the entire 
working memory is wiped in secure fashion (using a wrapper function for several 
compiler- and platform-specific secure zero-memory calls). There are also the 
clear_password and clear_secret flags which allow for secure wiping of the password 
𝑃 and secret 𝐾 during initialization. In addition, regardless of flags settings, both the 
initial hash and the xor-result of the final column are always securely wiped. As such 
while Argon2d is theoretically vulnerable to GCAs the scheme offers options to miti-
gate this in practice. 
4.5 Additional Commentary 
The Argon2 family of password hashing schemes is very versatile and can function as 
password hashing scheme or key derivation function under different conditions and 
on different defender hardware setups. But this versatility also comes with, in our 
opinion, its downsides. While the specifications list some recommended parameter 
values (with regards to memory usage, scheme variant and parallelism degree) for 
several different use-cases these are rather generic and both hardware setup (available 
defender CPU and RAM) and use-case (and corresponding threat model) might differ. 
It can thus be tempting for a software developer, unfamiliar with the details of pass-
word hashing schemes and eager to optimize performance, to specify parameter val-
ues (in terms of memory usage and number of iteration) which offer insufficient pro-
tection in the context of their threat model. In addition the optionality of some 
memory wiping options (and the little mention they receive in the specifications) 
might obscure their necessity within certain threat models. In short, the versatility 
offered by the scheme might give some users ‘just enough rope to hang themselves 
with’. Instead of reducing this versatility however (which might negatively impact 
widespread adoption of the scheme) it would be preferable if a thorough study was 
undertaken evaluating different use-cases with different threat models and different 
hardware setups and distilled recommended parameters for all of these cases as a 
reference for less cryptographically literate developers. 
 
Interestingly the research that lead to the Argon2 design [2, 43, 47] showed explicitly 
the juxtaposition that exists between security against TMTO attacks and side-channel 
attacks in the design of memory-hard functions with data-dependent indexing func-
tions protecting more against the former but being more vulnerable to the latter and 
vice-versa for data-independent functions. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that password hashing schemes in general are no complete 
mitigation of problems intrinsically associated with passwords as an authentication 
mechanism. The very nature of passwords, “easy to remember, hard to guess”, tends 
to result in people choosing passwords which they think are hard to guess but are not 
[71]. Here it is important to understand that passwords are not generated according to 
criteria commonly imposed on cryptographic keys: as they are chosen by people, their 
keyspace and entropy are much lower and they often include predictable elements 
related to the people who pick them (pet names, date of birth, hobbies, etc.) all of 
which results in relatively small keyspaces for an attacker to work with. Various miti-
gations for this problem have been proposed, from using passphrases [75] or ‘dice-
ware’ passwords [72] (where passwords consist of a concatenation of multiple indi-
vidual words chosen at random based on a diceroll) and similar schemes [73] to solu-
tions like Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) where multiple tokens (eg. a password 
combined with a hardware-based token [74] or code sent over an out-of-band channel 
such as SMS [75]) are required for authentication. A downside of many of these solu-
tions is that they either lay the responsibility for secure password generation with end-
users (eg. diceware, passphrases, etc.) or tend to come with additional development 
complications and infrastructural cost (eg. MFA).  
 
In addition, passwords or phrases even when composed from the concatenation of 
multiple (individually easy-to-remember) words are insufficient in the face of clever 
attackers. Such attackers can generate password candidates on the basis of harvested 
personal information [76] or use smart, adaptive password cracking strategies or tech-
niques (such as those exhibited in the KoreLogic ‘Crack Me If You Can’ contest [57], 
the use of Ordered Markov Enumerators [39] or Markov-modelling based dictionary 
attacks [40]) to optimize the cracking process through an optimized guessing order 
[39], reduction of the password space [40] or identification of patterns present in the 
weakest passwords in a database and extrapolate them to other passwords using 
masks [58, 59] or thematic dictionaries [60]. Furthermore even if people choose a 
strong password the omnipresent practice of password reuse [3] remains as a threat. 
Using the same, strong, password in multiple places means that a compromise of cre-
dentials to one (low security) service translates directly to compromise of other (pos-
sibly high security) services. To make matters even worse even if an authentication 
service employs a cryptographically secure hashing scheme the attacker can often 
simply bypass it by backdooring the login functionality instead [77] and logging the 
plaintext versions of the password before they are passed to the hashing function. In 
such a scenario neither strong passwords nor secure password hashing schemes offer 
any protection and a tendency for password reuse will translate to an impact on other 
services as well. 
 
In conclusion, while password cracking would definitely be far less successful in the 
presence of a secure password hashing scheme like Argon2 it should not be consid-
ered a complete silver bullet against problems associated with passwords in general 
(especially in the face of knowledgeable and well-equipped attackers) and wherever 
possible authentication schemes ought to be augmented to some form of multi-factor 
authentication to at least complicate an attacker’s efforts in achieving unauthorized 
authentication. 
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